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INTRODUCTION

Thank you, Dean Feerick, for including me on this program.
A beautiful day like today makes even a confirmed Californian
enjoy New York City.
Last November I traveled to Japan. A group of aspiring environmental lawyers asked me to give a series of lectures to bar associations in Tokyo and Osaka, as well as to deliver the keynote
address at the founding meeting of the Japan Environmental
Lawyers Federation (JELF). JELF hopes to become Japan's first
public interest environmental law firm.
I was terribly impressed by the lawyers I met in Japan. They expressed deep interest in our environmental laws generally, and,
in particular, in our tradition of allowing citizens access to the
courts to enforce those laws against polluters and the government. Japanese environmental law - with the exception of some
well-known cases involving toxics - is in its infancy, and the
challenges facing lawyers seeking to build an environmental practice there are profound. Japan has no Freedom of Information
Act (FOIA),' no National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),2 no

4
Endangered Species Act (ESA), 3 and no citizen suit provisions.
Japan lacks even rules governing civil discoveryl Yet the lawyers I
met were uniformly creative, dedicated, and inspired. I have no
doubt they will succeed.
My trip to Japan and my conversations there led me to reflect
on our own country's first twenty-five years of citizen-enforced
environmental law. Virtually all of our important environmental
statutes date from the late 1960s and early 1970s, a period that

Partner, Miller & Sher, Sacramento, CA, and former President,
Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund. The opinions in this article are solely
those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the views of either
the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund or its clients.
1. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1996).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1994).
3. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994).
4. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1997).
*
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gave us NEPA, 5 the Clean Water Act of 1977,6 the Clean Air Act,
the ESA, 8 the National Forest Management Act, 9 and other key
laws.
We indeed have much to be proud of in this history. No institution has been so important to the environment as the courts,
and no aspect of the judicial system has been so important as citizen enforcement of our environmental laws. Examples are
legion:
" Last summer, President Clinton announced that a massive
gold and silver mine proposed for just outside of Yellowstone
National Park, and which threatened to destroy rivers running through the Park, would not proceed. 10 In its coverage
of the announcement, however, the media missed a key
point. After public officials declined to act, citizens brought a
lawsuit under the citizen suit provisions of the Clean Water
Act" and forced the mining conglomerate to the table. Only
2
then did a "win-win" settlement that saved the Park result.
" Litigation to protect the ancient forests of the Pacific Northwest 13 resulted in what the American Lawyer magazine called
the "most important public lands management litigation in
this country's history,"1 4 and revolutionized management of
millions of acres of federal forests in three states.' 5

5. See supra note 2.
6. Pub. L. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 33 U.S.C.).
7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671.
8. See supra note 3.
9. 16 U.S.C. § 1604 (1985).
10. See John F. Harris, That Near Yellowstone, A Deal Saves the Land,
WASH. POST, Aug. 13, 1996, at A4; Todd S. Purdum, Clinton Unveils Plan
to Halt Gold Mine Near Yellowstone, NY. TIMEs, Aug. 13, 1996, at A10.
11. 33 U.S.C. § 1365.
12. See Beartooth Alliance v. Crown Butte Mines, 904 F. Supp. 1168
(D. Mont. 1995).
13. See, e.g., Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Babbitt, 998 F.2d 705 (9th
Cir. 1993); Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Espy, 998 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1993);
Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Evans, 952 F.2d 297 (9th Cir. 1991); Seattle
Audubon Soc'y v. Lyons, 871 F. Supp. 1291 (W.D. Wash. 1994), aff'd, 80
F.3d 1401 (9th Cir. 1996).
14. Roger Parloff, Liti.-slating, How the Timber Industry Gets Its Local
Congressman to Fix Its Cases, AM. LAw., Jan. 1992, at 80.
15. See generally Victor M. Sher, Travels With Strix: The Spotted Owl's
Journey through the Federal Courts, 14 PUB. LAND L. REv. 41 (1993).
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Over the last quarter-century, litigation has protected our air,
water, and land from poisons; preserved priceless wilderness areas; held countless polluters accountable for their actions; forced
government agencies to fulfill their ecological responsibilities;
and saved millions of acres of habitat crucial to the survival of
endangered species.
Yet this twenty-five year tradition actually is both recent and
fragile. Two years ago, my talk at this conference would have focused on developments in these and similar cases under a defined and seemingly stable body of substantive and procedural
laws that apply to management of federal natural resources. Litigators and scholars would ordinarily focus on issues such as: an
agency's obligation to consider the effects on threatened and endangered species of programmatic decisions under ESA; 16 the adequacy of plans to manage the ancient forests of the Pacific
Northwest;17 the President's right to engage in ex parte efforts to
influence the Endangered Species Committee on decisions to
proceed with federal actions likely to jeopardize the survival of
an endangered species;1 8 the obligation to address a reasonable
range of alternatives for proposed logging under the NEPA;19 the
need for an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) in connection with critical habitat designation under ESA;20 and the like.
The 104th Congress, however, changed all that. Between January 1995 and December 1996, the major issue was whether any
laws intended to protect the environment, or indeed, any laws at
a1, applied to vast tracts of our federal lands. It is not an overstatement to say that during this period the most important characteristic of the management of public resources, especially timber, was either the absence of law or the threat that otherwise

16. See, e.g., Pacific Rivers Council v. Thomas, 30 F3d 1050 (9th
Cir. 1994); Lane County Audubon Soc'y v. Jamison, 958 F.2d 290 (9th
Cir. 1992).
17. See cases cited supra note 13.
18. See Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Endangered Species Comm.,
984 E2d 1534 (9th Cir. 1993).
19. See, e.g., Alaska Wilderness Recreation and Tourism Ass'n v.
Morrison, 67 F.3d 723 (9th Cir. 1995).
20. Compare Catron County Bd. of Comms. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife
Serv., 75 F.3d 1429, 1434 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding the EIS required),
with Douglas County v. Babbitt, 48 F3d 1495, 1501 (9th Cir. 1995)
(holding that EIS not required), cert. denied, __ U.S. _, 116 S. Ct. 698
(1996).
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applicable law would disappear altogether in response to environmental litigation. This period illustrated with unprecedented
drama how the future of public lands depends on the relationship between the courtroom and the Congress, and the tenuous
grasp of our federal environmental laws on continued existence
and meaning.
The most dramatic act of the 104th Congress concerning public natural resources, and perhaps the most anti-environmental
legislation this country has ever seen, was the so-called Rescissions Act of 1995.21 In my talk this afternoon, I want to tell you
about the Rescissions Act, discuss some of the litigation brought
under the Act, and offer some thoughts and lessons about where
we go from here.
THE MOST ANTI-ENVIRONMENTAL LAW OF THEM ALL

The sponsors of the Rescissions Act made no secret of their
hopes that it would elevate logging above all other uses of our
public forests and eliminate bothersome suits by citizens attempting to enforce environmental laws. As Charles Taylor (R-N.C.),
one of the bill's original sponsors in the House of Representatives, summed up:
This means, for example, that the . . . [Forest Service] cannot

be sued for violation of the Clean Water Act; the provisions of
the National Forest Management Act concerning species' viability, unsuitability, or consistency with the resource management
plans, or the jeopardy or take standards of the Endangered
Species Act .

. .

. [Finally], a sale can be offered even if it

would be barred under any decision, injunction, or order of
any federal court.22

21. Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Additional Disaster Assistance, for Anti-terrorism Initiatives, for Assistance in the Recovery from the Tragedy that Occurred at Oklahoma City, and Rescissions

Act of 1995, Pub. L. 104-19, 19 Stat. 194 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.). The Rescissions Act is not the first suspension of environmental laws by Congress. For a general discussion of
previous site-specific interventions with the general operations of otherwise applicable environmental laws, see Victor M. Sher & Carol Sue

Hunting, Eroding the Landscape, Eroding the Laws: CongressionalExemptions
from Judicial Review of Environmental Laws, 15 HARv. ENvTL. L. REv. 435
(1991).
22. 141 CONG. REc. H3233 (daily ed. Mar. 15, 1995).
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The primary focus of the timber provisions of the Rescissions
Act was the "Emergency Timber Salvage" sale program.23 In passing these provisions, Congress said it intended to expedite the
logging of a "backlog of dead and dying trees in [the] National
Forests and other public lands .... -24 The Act provided for a
streamlined sales process 25 and an expedited and extremely limited judicial review process. 26
To streamline timber sales, the Rescissions Act left all environmental documents and information - including specifically
those ordinarily required under both the National Environmental Policy Act of 196927 and the Endangered Species Act of 197328
to the "sole discretion" of the agencies. 29 Moreover, any documents and procedures undertaken by the agencies were expressly
deemed to satisfy NEPA, the National Forest Management Act of
1976, the Endangered Species Act of 1973, and all other environ30
mental laws normally applicable to timber sales.
The Rescissions Act purported to allow judicial review of salvage sales, albeit in limited ways. On the face of the Act, a court
could permanently (but not preliminarily) enjoin, modify, or
void a salvage timber sale if, after a "review of the record," the
court found that the decision to allow the salvage timber sale was
"arbitrary and capricious or otherwise not in accordance with applicable law . ... "31
President Clinton vetoed the bill once, citing the extent which
32
it unnecessarily sought to override existing environmental laws.

However, he then signed it on the mistaken understanding that
the Act would allow the agencies the discretion to follow existing
law.33 The President promised that the Forest Service, the Bureau
23. Rescissions Act § 2001, Pub. L. No. 104-19, 109 Stat. 240 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1611).
24. H.R. REP. No. 104-124, at 134 (1995).
25. See Rescissions Act § 2001(b)-(c).
26. See § 2001(f).
27. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C).

28. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a) (2).
29. Rescissions Act § 2001 (c) (1) (C).
30. See § 2001(i).

31. § 2001(f) (4).
32. See 141 CONG. REC. H5683 (daily ed. June 7, 1995).
33. See id.; see also Deanne E. Parker,Backdoor Tactics to Forest Management: The Emergency Salvage Timber Rider of H.R. 1944, 16 J. ENERGY
NAT. RESOURCES & ENvrL. L. 216, 216 (1996).
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of Land Management and other government agencies would
fully comply with all environmental laws governing logging on
federal forests. 34 The President subsequently issued a formal directive instructing federal agencies to implement the logging
rider "in accordance with .. . existing forest and land manage35
ment policies and plans, and existing environmental laws."
Pursuant to the President's directive the Departments of Agriculture, Interior, and Commerce, and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), entered into a formal Memorandum of
Agreement,3 6 the purpose of which was "to reaffirm the commitment of the signatory parties to continue their compliance with
the requirements of existing environmental law while carrying
out the objectives of the timber salvage activities authorized by
the [Rescissions Act]." 37 The agencies expressly pledged "to implement salvage sales under the [Act] with the same substantive
environmental protection as provided by otherwise applicable en38
vironmental laws."
THE RESCISSIONS

ACT IN PRACrICE

Did the President's efforts to preserve the existing environmental standards (in agency practice, if not in law) work? Well,
no.
In Inland Empire Public Lands Council v. Glickman,39 plaintiffs unsuccessfully challenged the Forest Service's decision to proceed
with the Kootenai salvage sales, which will log right through grizzly bear management units and prevent those units from complying with the agency's own bear management standards until well

34. See Paul Maynard Kakuske, Clear-Cutting Public Participationin
Environmental Law: The Emergency Salvage Timber Sale Program, 29 Loy.
LA L. REv. 1859, 1891-92 (1996).
35. Memorandum from William J. Clinton, President of the U.S.,
to Secretaries of Interior, Agriculture, Commerce and EPA Administration Re: Implementing Timber-Related Provisions of Public Law 104-19
(Aug. 1, 1995).
36. Cover Letter Re: Salvage Sale Provisions of P.L. 104-19 and
Memorandum of Agreement (Aug. 18, 1995), reprinted in 141 CONG.
REC. H8788-01 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 1995) (Enclosure 2 & 3).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. 911 E Supp. 431 (D. Mont. 1995), affd, 88 F.3d 697 (9th Cir.
1996).
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into the twenty-first century. 40 Despite the obvious departure
from existing legal standards and current forest plans, the Ninth
Circuit held that the Forest Service "did not need to consider
the effect on the grizzly bear" of the sale.41 Indeed, the court
concluded, the Act gave the Forest Service "discretion to disregard entirely the effect [of logging] on the grizzly bear."42
In Idaho Conservation League v. Thomas,43 the Forest Service de-

cided to proceed with the Thunderbolt salvage sale over the objections of all other expert agencies (including the EPA, the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), the U.S. Fish & Wildlife
Service (USFWS), and the Idaho Department of Fish and
Game). 44 The sale, located in the South Fork Salmon River
drainage in central Idaho, was the site of the single largest producer of spring and summer Chinook salmon in the Columbia
River Basin. However, since the 1950s the area has suffered severe erosion and stream sedimentation caused by mining, grazing, logging and associated road building.4
The Forest Service's decision to proceed with the sale drew
what the district court called "harsh and substantial criticism"
from every agency with environmental expertise. 46 The expert
agencies objected to the sale on grounds that the logging would
further aggravate the already critically degraded habitat for
threatened salmon. 47 As the court summarized the record:
The EPA recommended against the Project, noting that the
proposed action was inconsistent with collective agency decisions and resource protection goals for the South Fork Salmon
River watershed. The EPA concluded that the logging sale
would further aggravate the already critically degraded habitat
for threatened salmon. NMFS also strongly opposed the Project, concluding that [it], and the logging activity in particular,
40. See id. at 434-35.

41. Inland Empire Public Lands Council v. Glickman, 88 F.3d 697,
701 (9th Cir. 1996).
42. Id.

43. 917 E Supp. 1458 (D. Idaho 1995), aff'd, 91 F.3d 1345 (9th Cir.
1996).
44. See id.
45. See id. at 1460.

46. Id. at 1461.
47. See id. at 1461-62.
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will likely jeopardize the continued existence of the endangered salmon and will likely result in the destruction or adverse
modification of their critical habitat. The USFWS similarly opposed the salvage sale on the ground that it would likely result
in adverse impacts to fish and wildlife. The USFWS opined that
the proposed salvage actions would generate additional sediment in the already-impacted watershed, negating or delaying
the benefits from the restoration actions. The Idaho Department of Fish and Game also criticized the proposal to use logging to fund restoration projects. 48
The court went on to say:
The Forest Service readily concedes that the proposed Salvage
Sale, which will log from landslide prone .. .areas, is inconsistent with established management policies for the watershed.
Indeed, but for the Rescissions Act, the Salvage Sale could not
be implemented without amending the Land Resource 49Management Plans for the Boise and Payette National Forests.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit agreed that under the Rescissions Act "the sale is not subject to any federal environmental or
natural resources laws." 5 0 Therefore, the court concluded, "the
Forest Service did not act arbitrarily or capriciously" in approv51
ing the sale.
Inland Empire and Idaho Conservation League demonstrated dramatically the illusory nature of government "commitments" to
follow environmental laws in the absence of citizen enforcement.
Despite explicit promises from the President, the secretaries, and
the agencies to continue to follow existing plans and laws, the
agencies failed to do so. Ordinarily, citizens would have held
them accountable in court. Under the Clearcut Rider to the
Rescissions Act,5 2 however, nobody could do so. The result was
injury to endangered grizzly bears and salmon.

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id,at 1461-62.
Id. at 1465-66.
Glickman, 91 F.3d at 1349.
Idaho Conservation League, 917 E Supp. at 1465.
Pub. L. No. 104-19, § 2001(c) (2), 109 Stat. 240 (1995).
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ACT

AND THE ANCIENT FORESTS OF THE PACIFIC

NORTHWEST: DESTROYING A DECADE OF PROGRESS TOWARD LEGALITY,
CERTAINTY AND STABILITY

Between 1987 and 1993 the federal courts decided more than
a dozen lawsuits involving the ancient forests of Oregon, Washington and northern California and the species that depend on
them. 3 These cases revealed what the district court called a "remarkable series of violations of the environmental laws" involving
"a deliberate and systematic refusal by [federal agencies] to com5 4
ply with the laws protecting wildlife."

In 1994, following President Clinton's personal intervention
and participation in an April 1993 Forest Conference in Portland, Oregon, the government prepared and adopted a management plan for these forests (known widely as "Option 9") that
sought to reconcile current scientific information about species
viability with existing legal standards.55 In December 1994, a federal district court upheld the plan as being in minimal compliance with the law:
[A]ny more logging sales than the plan contemplates would
probably violate the laws. Whether the plan and its implementation will remain legal will depend on future events and
conditions. 56
Eight months later, the Rescissions Act threw gasoline on the
nearly extinguished coals of this explosive and long fought controversy in at least two ways. First, it actually required the govern-

53. See, e.g., Headwaters, Inc. v. B.L.M., Medford Dist., 914 F.2d
1174, 1184 (9th Cir. 1990) (Cal.); Portland Audobon Soc'y v. Lujan, 884
F.2d 1233, 1236 (9th Cir. 1989) (Or.); Northern Spotted Owl v. Hodel,
716 F. Supp. 479, 483 (W.D. Wash. 1988) (Wash.). See generally Sher,
Travels with Strix, supra note 15.
54. Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Evans, 771 F. Supp. 1081, 1089, 1090
(W.D. Wash. 1991), aff'd, 952 F.2d 292 (9th Cir. 1991).
55. See Management for Habitat for Late-Successional and OldGrowth Forest Related Species Within the Range of the Northern Spotted Owl; National Forests in Washington, Oregon, and California, 59
Fed. Reg. 18,788 (1994). Option 9 is described in detail in Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Lyons, 871 F. Supp. 1291, 1304-06 (W.D. Wash. 1994), affid
sub nom. Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Moseley, 80 F.3d 1401 (9th Cir.
1996).
56. Lyons, 871 F. Supp. at 1300.
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ment to sell timber even the agencies did not want to sell. Second, the Act insulated otherwise illegal timber sales from lawsuits
by citizens.
A.

Forcing The Government To Sell Timber
Even It Did Not Want To Sell

In Northwest Forst Resouires Council v. Glickman,57 arising from a
lawsuit filed by the timber industry, the district court issued a series of rulings that eviscerated federal environmental laws, previous decisions by federal agencies not to sell timber for environmental reasons, past decisions by the federal courts declaring
timber sales illegal under environmental laws, and even scientific
protocols for determining the presence of threatened or endangered species.
First, the court held that the Act required the immediate release, without compliance with environmental laws, of all timber
sales ever offered in Washington and Oregon.5 8 In opposing the
industry motion that led to the court's ruling, the government
submitted declarations showing that these logging sales will irreparably harm the forests and adversely affect the ability of
59
threatened and endangered species to survive.
Nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit affirmed on these points. Emphasizing that "[i]t is not our role to determine the wisdom of
Section 2001(k) (1), only its meaning," 6° the court of appeals

57. 82 F3d 825 (9th Cir. 1996).
58. See id. at 836.
59. On appeal, Senator Patrick J. Leahy and ten Members of the
House of Representative stated in an amicus brief filed with the Court
of Appeals,
Contrary to the district court's orders, Congress meant for
§ 2001(k) (1) to release only timber sales previously offered or
sold under section 318 of Pub. L. 101-121. The expansive interpretation adopted by the district court in no way reflects
what Congress as a whole understood § 2001(k) to do.
Amicus Brief for U.S. Sen. Patrick J. Leahy, Reps. David E. Bonior, Elizabeth Furse, Jim McDermott, George Miller, David E. Skaggs, Gerry E.
Studds, Bruce Vento, Sidney R. Yates, and Karen McCarthy, Northwest
Forest Resource Council v. Glickman, 82 E3d 825 (9th Cir. 1996) (Nos.
95-36038, 95-36042).
60. Glickman, 82 F3d at 828.
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held that the Act's "mandatory language," 61 "direct[s] the [government] to release 'all timber sale contracts offered or awarded
between October 1, 1990 and July 27, 1995, in any national forest
in Oregon and Washington or [BLM] district in western
Oregon'." 62
The court of appeals did qualify this ruling in two important
respects. First, the court held that at least certain sales that had
been declared illegal by the courts under their authorizing statutes were void from the outset, and therefore were not "sales"
released by the Rider. 63 This ruling saved from the chain saws
several particularly awful timber sales in the Northwest, which
had been declared illegal in 1990 in earlier lawsuits. 64 On the
other hand, the court held that a number of sales that the government had withdrawn pursuant to stipulation following the
earlier declarations of illegality by previous courts must proceed
65
under the Act.

Second, in a subsequent decision, the court allowed the government to protect habitat of the marbled murrelet. 66 This ruling
was especially significant, since requiring the government to proceed with these timber sales would have affected greatly the assumptions about species viability that underlie the President's
plan for the old-growth forests (Option 9).67 This ruling saved
about seventy-seven timber sales that the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service had determined would jeopardize the continued existence
of this species. 6s

61. Id. at 831.
62. Id. at 828.
63. Id. at 830. The court's ruling was, however, ambiguous as to
certain other timber sales that had been declared illegal for various
reasons; however, the court denied a subsequent motion for clarification. NFRC v. Glickman, No. 96-35106 (9th Cir. Jul. 29, 1996) (Order
denying motion for clarification and petitions for rehearing and rehearing en banc).
64. See cases cited supra note 54.
65. See Glickman, 82 F.3d at 834.
66. See NFRC v. Pilchuck Audubon Soc'y, 97 E3d 1161, 1167 (9th
Cir. 1996).
67. See supra note 56.
68. See Pilchuck Audubon Soc'y, 97 F3d at 1167.
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The long-term impact of these rulings on Option 9 remains
unclear. The ultimate effect on the management plan of allowing
some of the most environmentally egregious sales to proceed will
change the environmental baseline, since Option 9 assumed the
areas encompassed by these sales would be protected.
B.

Insulating Otherwise Illegal Sales From Citizen Suits

In Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Thomas, 69 citizens sued
over a group of timber sales in the Upper North Umpqua River
Basin, an area famous for its stunning scenery and clear, jadegreen rushing water. The case sought to enforce Option 9.70 One
of Option 9's primary purposes was to protect salmon and other
fish and wildlife populations, requiring surveys of aquatic species
and analyses of potential impacts on those species in proposed
sale areas. 71 Nonetheless, these sales were planned without
aquatic surveys, and without any input from fisheries biologists,
notwithstanding one biologist's conclusion that logging would severely degrade the aquatic habitat and make it inhospitable for
72
fish.
In rejecting the lawsuit, the Ninth Circuit started with "the
Act's manifest intent to eliminate environmental challenges to
Option 9 timber sales" 73 and the need not to "frustrate one of
the Rescission Act's primary purposes: to enable the logging of
timber on Option 9 land." 74 The court noted that the Act
doesn't require any documents or procedures for Option 9 timber sales. The effect . . ., therefore, is to render sufficient
under the environmental laws whatever documents and procedures, ifany, the agency elects to use for an Option 9 sale. 75
The court emphasized that the Act "is best interpreted as requiring the disregard . . . of environmental laws .... ",76 Indeed, the
court suggested that the timber industry "could well have pre-

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

92 E3d 792 (9th Cir. 1996).
See id. at 794-95.
See id at 795; see also Lyons, 871 F. Supp. at 1305.
See Oregon Nat. Resources Council, 92 F.3d at 795.
Id. at 797 n.10.
Id,at 795 n.7.
Id. at 795 (emphases added).
Id. at 796 (emphasis added).
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vailed in a suit . . . [alleging] that .. the Rescissions Act forbade
the agency to consider environmental factors."7 7 In response to the
contention that the Forest Service had overlooked important environmental considerations under Option 9, the court explained:
Whether an agency has overlooked "an important aspect of the
problem," however, turns on what a relevant substantive statute
makes "important." In law, unlike in religion or philosophy,
78
there is nothing which is necessarily important or relevant.
Under the Rescissions Act, the court concluded, environmental
factors were "legally irrelevant," and the courts could not ex79
amine agency conduct because "there's no law to apply."
WHAT'S NEXT?

The Rescissions Act expired at the end of 1996. Congressional
efforts to renew it, or to enact similar provisions, failed in the
face of election-year politics.
The issues surrounding the Rescissions Act, however, are far
from dead. Senator Larry Craig (R-Idaho) has introduced a new
bill that is nothing short of a bald attempt to turn our National
Forests into tree farms.80 The bill would accomplish this by (1)
severely weakening existing environmental safeguards, (2) undermining the system of checks and balances that holds government
agencies and the timber industry accountable, (3) limiting public
participation in forest policy, and (4) making logging the dominant use of the National Forests at the explicit expense of nonconsumptive uses like water quality, fish and wildlife, and
recreation.
The Craig Bill would turn the entire management framework
for National Forests upside down. Congress adopted existing law,
the National Forest Management Act (NFMA), in 1976 in an explicit policy decision to end timber dominance. 81 The NFMA
sought to establish standards that would protect the forests from
damage caused by historical excesses of logging, mining and
77. Id. at 798 (emphasis added).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Public Lands Management Improvement Act of 1997, S. 1253,
105th Cong. (1997).
81. 16 U.S.C. § 1604.
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grazing.8 2 Thus, the NFMA required the Forest Service to protect
fish and wildlife habitat and water quality, while imposing strict
limits on clearcutting and other activities that harm forests.8 3 The
Craig Bill reverses that approach by proposing to turn current
environmental standards into unenforceable "policies," while at
the same time making logging and other commodity outputs
84
mandatory and enforceable.
The bill attempts to set up a catch-22 scheme guaranteeing
that, once a forest plan is in place, all logging, road building,
mining, grazing and other activities go forward with virtually no
possibility of stopping them in court - no matter how much
damage they might cause. The bill would accomplish this by:
1) prohibiting any legal challenges that are based on laws or
safeguards that were in effect at the time a forest plan 6 was
adopted 5 - including, for example, the Clean Water Act;8
2) requiring any challenge based on a new law or new information to be preceded by a petition to amend the plan - a process that could take from 90 days (if the petition is rejected) to
two years (if it is accepted and a plan revision process
ensues) ;87
3) barring courts from stopping any on-the-ground activities
while a plan amendment or revision process is underway - no
matter how much damage that may be causing;ss
4) allowing the agencies to proceed with any activities that
would have been allowed under a prior forest plan - even if
the current forest plan is declared illegal and even if the old
forest plan was worse that the one declared illegal;8 9 and
5) requiring the agencies, when revising a forest plan, to maintain the same overall balance amount forest uses that was contained in the plan being changed - in other words, if the original plan was being revised because new information showed
the agency had been overcutting the forest to the detriment of
fish, wildlife, and recreation, the Craig/industry Bill would
nonetheless force them to maintain the same balance between

82. See
83. See
84. See
85. See
86. See
87. See
88. See
89. See

§ 1604(g) (3) (D)-(F).
§ 1604(g) (3) (B)-(C).
S. 1253 § 107(a).
id.
id. § 204.
id. § 113.
id. § 107(b)(2).
id. § 107(d).

1997]

SURVEYING THE WRECKAGE

603

logging and those other resources that was in the original
plan 0
The bill would also allow the Forest Service and BLM to meet
in secret with representatives of the timber, mining, and livestock
industries to cut deals regarding timber contracts, mining permits, or grazing leases - or even the rules governing those activities.9 1 Such meetings were all too common in the past. In fact, a
1994 investigation by the U.S. Agriculture Department's Inspector General found that for many years, top forest Service personnel met privately with industry representatives. " 92 The Inspector
General concluded that the meetings "give the appearance of
undue influence on Forest Service policy." 93 The Craig/industry
bill attempts to allow a return to the good old days of backroom
deal making out of the public eye.
A section tided "Wildlife Protection" would actually jeopardize
fish and wildlife by attempting to eliminate one of the most important checks and balances on arbitrary or illegal government
actions: the requirement that a government agency consult with
independent scientists from the Fish and Wildlife Service or the
National Marine Fisheries Service before taking actions that might
lead to the extinction of a threatened or endangered species. 94
Senator Craig and the timber industry want to let the Forest Service and BLM just consult with themselves before taking such actions. 95 They might call it "self-consultation," but we call it "selfabuse" because the agencies' record of abuse of similar authority
under the Clearcut Rider was abysmal: they repeatedly ignored
the warnings and recommendations of state and federal fish,
wildlife, and water quality officials.
A section titled "Water Quality Protection" could put water
quality at risk for tens of millions of Americans by letting the

90. See id. §§ 105, 107(a), 117(d); see also 143 CONG. REc. S10,31906, 10,326, 10,328 (1997) (description of §§ 107, 117 by Sen. Craig).
91. See S. 1253 § 206.
92. See Michael Doyle, Forest Service Warned of Getting Too Close to
Logging Foes, SACRAMENTO BEE, May 11, 1994, at B1, available in
1994 WL 5232993; Scott Sonner, Forest Service Now Investigated for Talks
with Timber Industry, SEATTLE TIMES, May 2, 1994, available in
1994 WL 3624349; see also Senator Says Forest Service, Timber Industry Hold
Pacts, OR.GONLAN, Mar. 13, 1994, at C02, available in 1994 WL 4544135.
93. Doyle, supra note 93.
94. See S. 1253 § 203.
95. See 143 CONG. REc. S10,319-06, 10,328 (1997).
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Forest Service and BLM decide for themselves whether the timber industry's logging and road building activities on the national forests comply with key state and federal water quality protections. 96 States could be cut out of the process for ensuring
that important water quality safeguards are followed and that
their rivers, lakes, and streams aren't polluted by runoff from
logging operations9 7

A section titled "Air Quality Protection" is similarly misnamed. 98 It seeks to undermine efforts to reduce air pollution by
allowing the Forest Service and BLM to ignore state and federal
clean air standards for setting fires, known as prescribed bums,
on the national forests. 9 Once again, the States could be barred
from ensuring that those activities don't cause smoke inversion
over local communities that could harm their citizens.
CONCLUSION: LESSONS

FOR THE

105TH

CONGRESS

Let me put all this in perspective with five final points:
First, strong environmental laws - enforceable in court by ordinary citizens - are more important today than ever as the keystone of environmental protection. The pitfalls of weak laws are
perhaps self-evident. But even strong laws can prove largely
meaningless in the absence of citizen monitoring and enforcement in court, as our experience under the Rescissions Act
demonstrated clearly.

Second, precisely because of the effectiveness of the combination of strong environmental laws and citizen access to the courts
to enforce them, anti-environmental interests now explicitly attack both. In the 104th Congress, this attack was especially strong
on public lands management issues, and especially concerning
timber. But look for the assault to widen.
Third, Congress can quite effectively change or even suspend
the laws - including the rights of citizens to enforce them it wants to.

96.
97.
98.
99.

S. 1253 § 204.
See 143 CONG. REc. S10,319-06, 10,328 (1997).
S. 1253 § 205.
See id.
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Fourth, strong laws will not last without the will to enforce
them. That will must exist both inside and outside the
courtroom.
Finally, we have made progress since the start of the 104th
Congress. The budget fights of early 1996 elevated environmental
concerns to prominence, a trend that continued in the end-ofterm defeat for several efforts to undermine environmental laws
(including a proposal to make the Clear-cut Rider permanent).
But the bad news is that the environment has become a political
wedge issue in a way that it never has been before, and that we
now face in Congress an explicitly anti-environmental constituency that has targeted citizen-enforced laws to accomplish its
ends. Unfortunately, much of that constituency is back in the
current Congress.

